My comments follow. They come from the perspective of having been a serving officer in the armed forces and as a student of military history. Or another way of saying that I am a student of the martial arts at a national level. Your book focuses on the individual, and my perspective is from a more broadly based point of view, however it is true that the essence of the national military strength is the basic need for the individual to be a successful warrior.
Military history is filled with many successful examples of individuals who have risen above the limitations of their training to take advantage of the circumstances in a given situation.
I found your section on the need for understanding the opposition - both in terms of moves planned, detection of repeatable patterns of actions, and the circumstances of the situation; to be the most perceptive. And the exercise examples to be enlightening.
The requirement - to be aware of the circumstances and to vary the response to the situation - is true of any warrior, at any level. The current buzz word to describe this need is to develop and maintain "situational awareness". A great amount of time and energy has been, and is being, devoted to developing this skill. The need to be continuously alert, to be able to read the signs, is in so many cases the difference which sorts out the survivors from the cannon fodder.
It has been my privilege to have been able to work with the designers of cockpit instrumentation to develop concepts/techniques that allow the fighter pilots to focus on the opposition - to be outside the canopy - to be able to focus on the emerging situation and not be mentally bound by their training on the operational procedures of administering the aircraft. To develop the ability to keep a "heads up and eyes moving" perspective and not a "heads down" focus. I find this example to be very similar to your presentation of a martial artist enrolled in one of the major martial arts schools.
The air forces of the world have found, to their sorrow, that over and over again that even the best trained fighter pilot frequently fails in the actual circumstances of the air battle. While there is always the possibility of failing due to a "golden bullet"; history shows that the pilot with the best situational awareness is the one who gets off the first aimed response. And he who makes the first significant move has the statistical edge to victory. This is also true for tank to tank combat.
Likewise, I was able to participate at the National Training Range in California where the Army has been conducting training against opposing Op Forces for some years. Here the units of the regular army meet another force, which is trained - actually only equipped - with Soviet weaponry. The sides are relatively evenly matched in terms of numbers and equipment levels and the task given is to attack and hold some terrain. The exercise includes both attack and defense. Data is collected during the engagements and there are serious discussions following the events. Participating units are able to plan their strategy well in advance of the engagement and no administrative disasters are imposed on their forces and yet - the new units most frequently lose to the Op Force.
This is true even though the regular forces have heard about the program , had been given adequate time to develop responses to prior specific cases. They have been debriefed by groups who have been previously involved, and even have real-time intelligence on just what they will be expected to meet on the day of the test.
Why is this the case? A common reason is hubris - arrogance caused by too much pride. A situation that I find related to your views on the "elders" of your craft.
We tell are people that they are most best. The best trained, equipped, and motivated force in the world. They are clearly better, by any measurable standard than a bunch of troops using Soviet style arms and tactics. Is this, or a similar point of view, shared at your school?
An equally important reason is that the regular army fights as they were trained. If one knows the training one can find a weakness and exploit it. This is true of any kind of training. Training is intended to develop a response to a given set of stimuli.
The National Training Range was not established to test the training of the rank-and-file soldiers. Very few of the simulated combats result in any changes to the way that the ordinary soldier goes about his tasking. They continue to function as they have been trained. The test is for the leadership, to the force managers, to the officers - to the mind of the establishment.
The typical combat exercise is to challenge the decision-making abilities of the young officers. Put them in a position outside their training. Put them in a situation that forces them to use initiative. This is the testing ground, this is where the benefits pay dividends.
Historically we have numerous examples: Hannibal cannot cross the Alps, the Japanese cannot travel through Malaya to reach Singapore, and General Nathan Forrest - one of the very few non-West Point trained Generals North or South - cannot conduct successful calvary operations in Union occupied Tennessee. Since these individuals did not know that they could not do these things - they did them.
And all this long-winded writing is background to suggestions for Volume 2. If I were to offer an area of critique for your excellent work, I would suggest that you place more emphasis on the general subject of knowledge.
For several reasons: Sun Tzu is quoted as having said, and I paraphrase - He who knows himself and his enemy will not lose. He who knows himself will win many battles. He who knows neither himself nor the enemy will lose.
Without a sound understanding of one’s strengths and limitations, one is seriously handicapped in any challenge situation. Just how a teacher can impart strengths and limitations - without compromising the students confidence - is a major challenge. The services use the devise of testing, with guided discussion; but they have a captive audience.
I have read that the purposes of Kata, a repetition of form, are many fold; to build muscle, to build automatic responses, to build confidence. But Kata should also build knowledge - knowledge of one’s own ability and weakness - and I am not sure that this aspect of the training is recognized/emphasized. Your proposed exercise go a long way to remedying this lack , in my view - but somewhere in the performance of the exercise should be the lesson learned on knowledge one one’s strengths and limitations. While I think this thought was in your mind, it didn’t come across clearly in the book. The target of any engagement is always the mind of the opposition. Once he thinks he will lose, he has lost.
The mind of the combatants are always assessing the situation. To think that one will lose is occasioned by the realization that the opposition is superior and for one to continue - or begin - the contest is a lost cause.
There are many ways of demonstrating superiority, in order to gain the superior mental position. One way is to show superior technique - break boards, drive nails with one’s fingers and flash, or the military parades, fly-overs, and demonstrations. Other ways are to engage in competition and let the side with the superior training and equipment triumph.
One historical example of possible relevance to your art, is the case of the gunfighters of the old west. The most successful fighters were not those who were good shots, nor those with the best equipment, nor those with the quick draws. Time after time, in actual face-to-face - the mano a mono shoot outs, the deciding difference was the ability to remain calm and go through with the act. The opposition failed to succeed because, as they said - He looked like he was going to succeed. He scared me into taking hasty and improper action. He had the look of a killer.
Note: History is repeat with many examples that losing a battle is not the same as losing a war. And, one must always fear the "beserker". The irrational warrior - an individual, or at a national level, who thinks irrationally and will press on in spite of the hopelessness of cause.
The latest line of military philosophy is to focus on the decision-making process and decision-time-line. Take steps to be inside the opposition’s mental window - to develop an effective approach that occurs within the opposition’s decision-time. Take advantage of his time-line-to-action and act to upset his cyle time. Such actions cause confusion, lack of confidence, and lead to hasty, poorly thought out reactions. The idea is to gain the upper hand, the high ground, and conduct the engagement from a position of strategic strength.
Please let me know when Volume 2 is planned for release.
